KEY FINDING, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Key Findings
Years of insecurity and ethnic and religious conflict have reshaped Mosul’s demographics, and vastly affected the functionality of its local administration, public institutions and economic establishments. In the decade that followed the fall of the previous regime, armed groups dominated the city and deprived it of a large part of its revenue. Rampant corruption exacerbated the problem and contributed to the take-over of the city’s resources.
The fall of the city to ISIL dramatically worsened the situation; its economy almost completely collapsed, its infrastructure and services declined, its public institutions were devastated, and its history and cultural heritage tragically effaced. The city’s minority groups, and many others, were forcefully moved and displaced, and their abandoned properties were confiscated by ISIL. Most of those who remained in the city live in abject conditions, with limited access to basic needs and services, including food and water.
This report has analysed the impact of the past years of crisis and the ongoing conflict on the city of Mosul, its population and functionality of the city. It gives a comprehensive picture of the state of the city by looking at twelve aspects of the crisis: demographics, economy, living conditions, urban governance, housing and land for housing, violations and informal settlements, real property, roads and transportation, infrastructure and public utilities, built environment and cultural heritage, health, and education. In what follows, the key findings of each of these aspects of the crisis will be outlined.
Demographics
Mosul city has experienced large-scale displacement, especially of its minority groups long before the current wave of displacements inflicted by ISIL.
While accurate statistical data on the city’s ethnoreligious composition is lacking, it is assumed that the city has always comprised of a majority Arab Sunni population (around 80 per cent), followed by Kurds, Christians, Turkomans, Shabak, and Yazidis. After ISIL gained control many of the city’s remaining religious and ethnic minorities fled.
Despite the mass exodus inflicted by ISIL, it is assumed that the city’s population has not changed substantially from pre-ISIL figures, because of the parallel inflow of rural migrants and IDPs from other parts of Nineveh, Salaheddin and Anbar Governorates, Syrian refugees, and ISIL fighters and their families.
Most of the incoming IDPs and rural migrants to Mosul city between 2003 and 2014 settled in some of the city’s poorest and least serviced neighbourhoods. According to local residents of Mosul, some of the newcomers were radicalised and joined Al-Qaeda and later supported ISIL in taking over the city in June 2014.
Economy
Mosul was a prominent commercial centre and its main export products were oil, and agricultural, industrial and mineral products.
Al-Qaeda and allied groups gained control over the city’s administration and economy years before ISIL came into power.
After taking control of the city in June 2014, ISIL fighters looted the city’s central bank, crushed enterprises and forcefully collected money from business owners and farmers to finance their campaigns. The city’s economy almost entirely collapsed as a result. Many businesses closed down, and unemployment levels and poverty rates increased.
Oil fields, refineries, gas factories and fuel stations fell under control of ISIL and ISIL subsequently monopolised oil sales within their territory.
ISIL took control of agricultural production and equipment loaned by the government to local farmers and from minorities who fled. They also forced farmers to sell their products at lower rates. The combination of dwindling financial returns and a volatile security situation led many farmers to stop working in the fields.
Living conditions
Although Nineveh is among the governorates with highest poverty rates, Mosul city was a prominent commercial centre.
Since ISIL took control of the city, and crushed the local economy, unemployment levels and poverty rates have increased significantly. The situation was further aggravated by the following factors:
-- In July 2015 the Iraqi Government was not able to continue transferring the salaries of government employees living in ISIL-occupied territories;
-- The city’s poor families stopped receiving rations from the Public Distribution System they used to rely on for survival;
-- Hefty fees, penalties and taxes exacerbated the vulnerability of most city residents;
-- Prices of basic commodities inflated dramatically, especially after the Peshmerga closed the highways used to transport weapons and ammunition to ISIL fighters in September 2015.
It is likely that many of those who arrived into Mosul in 2006 from its rural hinterlands and adjacent districts are among the city’s most vulnerable groups, making them easy preys for ISIL recruitment.
